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SAFETY ATTITUDES IN THE AVIATION SYSTEM: INFLUENCES OF A HIGHLY REGULATED
ENVIRONMENT
Teresa C. D’Oliveira
Instituto Superior de Psicologia Aplicada
Lisbon, Portugal

Although safety is considered paramount in the aviation industry, very few studies have explored the influence that
such a highly regulated environment may have on safety attitudes. This paper explores how perceptions and attitudes
may be influenced by context characteristics and analyses how a highly regulated context, such as the aviation
industry, compares with other industries. Results suggest that the aviation industry seems to be centered on
individual behaviors and attitudes towards safety; in contrast other industries highlight safety at the organizational
level. Implications of these results and repercussions of national safety campaigns to promote safety at the
workplace are considered.
Introduction
Workplace safety and, in particular, the analysis of
occupational accidents have emphasized the
importance and interrelationship of two main
contributors: The technical component which
involves physical working conditions, machinery,
equipment and work instruments and the Human
component comprising job incumbents, teams,
supervisors and top managers (e.g., Oliver, Cheyne,
Tomás & Cox, 2002; Sarkus, 2001). The
development of a positive safety culture and
constructive attitudes towards safety are considered
as an important and effective strategy to promote and
maintain a safe workplace. In many instances,
attitude surveying is recommended as a quick and
helpful way of conducting a safety diagnostic.
The literature on safety attitudes presents a variety of
dimensions and a plethora of instruments (e.g., Cox
and Cox, 1991; Díaz & Cabrera, 1997; Glendon,
Staton & Harrison, 1994; Zohar, 1980). A renaming
and grouping exercise on the existent measures is
considered necessary (Guldenmund, 2000; Sorensen,
2002) with possible identification of core dimensions
and clear explanations on the issue of dimensionality.
These efforts led to the development of a measure to
evaluate attitudes towards safety that can be used in
various contexts (D’Oliveira, 2004). A methodology
similar to the one adopted by Williamson, Feyer,
Cairns and Biancotti (1997) was used and a measure
considering eight scales was put together. Safety
areas considered were: Organizational objectives,
organizational practices and safety, information on
safety issues, management and supervisors’ attitudes,
personal attitudes to safety, risk perceptions and
relationships with co-workers.
Safety is paramount in the aviation system and efforts
have considered both the technical component (e.g., by

fostering safer machinery) and human interventions
(e.g., through improved training like CRM). The
industry investments in standards and practices led to
an outstanding safety record (ICAO, 2004).
Context characteristics such as the activities
performed, the hazards involved and the degree of
regulation imposed by the industry may play an
important role when discussing safety attitudes and
safety culture. These characteristics have yet to be
considered in the literature on safety culture/climate.
Very few studies have considered safety attitudes in
different industries (e.g., Diaz & Cabrera, 1997). This
paper addresses these issues and explores how
perceptions and attitudes may be influenced by
context characteristics and analyses how a highly
regulated context, such as the aviation industry,
compares with other industries.
Method
Participants
A total of 346 participants, 60.4% men and 396
females, from various industries (aviation, health, car
industry, metal industry, etc.) were invited to
participate in this study. Table 1 presents sample’s
main characteristics.
Table 1. Participants’ main characteristics
Age
Qualifications
Contract
Position
Industry

M = 36.71, SD=10.09
M = 9.9 years
Full time permanent = 84.3 %
Supervisor = 19.1%
Aviation = 25.4%;
Non Aviation = 74.6%
Pilots, Cabin crew, Maintenance
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Instrument
A measure was developed using a methodology
similar to the one adopted by Williamson, Feyer,
Cairns and Biancotti (1997) was used in this study.
Specifically, a review of the literature was conducted
in order to identify potential measures of attitudes
towards workplace safety. All potential measures
were then considered as a full set and items were
assembled according to their content. This procedure
led to the identification of seven dimensions:
organizational objectives, organizational practices
and safety, information on safety issues, management
and supervisors’ attitudes, you and safety issues,
personal appreciation of risk and relationships with
coworkers. A detailed definition of each dimension
(Table 2) was then produced and eight items were
selected to represent each safety attitude dimension.
The final measure was composed of 56 items, each
item being responded in a 5 point rating scale.

behavior to safety in general ( = .776).
F – Risk Perceptions
In this dimension workers’ perceptions of the
risks involved in their activities are considered
along with their estimative of how probable it is
to be involved in an accident ( = .717).
G – Relationships with coworkers
This dimension considers workers perceptions of
their colleagues’ knowledge and behaviors
related to safety. It also includes the perception of
being part of a group and how this characteristic
influences personal behavior ( = .808).
Procedure
A general instruction was given to every participant as
to how they should fill in the questionnaire: volunteers
should give a description of their own company
regarding safety issues. The objective of the study was
to gather information that could help companies to
improve their safety policies and results.

Table 2. Safety attitude dimensions (Cronbach’s
values for each dimension).
Sub-Scale Definition
A – Organizational Objectives
This dimension considers how the Organization
values safety issues. The potential conflict
between safety and productivity, the Organization
openness to discuss issues related to safety and
proposals by the employees are some of the
issues considered in the literature ( = .725).
B- Organizational Practices & Safety
This dimension addresses how organizational
practices such as training, performance
evaluation,
promotion,
accident/incident
investigation may be related with safety ( =
.850).
C - Information on Safety Issues
This dimension tries to evaluate how the
Organization stimulates the diffusion of
information related with safety by creating safety
awards, safety bonus, how workers might present
suggestions or report their safety concerns, etc (
= .720).
D- Management & Supervisors Attitudes
In this dimension, supervisors and top managers’
behavior is considered by assessing workers
perceptions of their technical knowledge on
safety issues, proactive or reactive safety attitude
and their support to workers safety concerns ( =
.806).
E – Yourself & Safety
This dimension considers the knowledge and
satisfaction of workers in relation to safety and
their awareness of the consequences of their

Results
A total of seven MANOVAS were conduct in order
to explore potential differences between aviation and
non aviation participants. Table 3 summarizes main
results obtained in these analyses.
Table 3. Differences between aviation and nonaviation participants in each subscale
Sub-Scale
Organizational
Objectives
Organizational
Practices &
Safety
Information on
Safety Issues
Management
& Supervisors
Attitudes
Yourself &
Safety
Risk
Perceptions
Relationships
with
coworkers

Results
Pillai’s Trace= .163, F= 7,990;
p<.000
Non aviation has higher means
Pillai’s Trace= .108, F= 4,958;
p<.000
Pillai’s Trace= .135, F= 6,374;
p<.000
Non aviation has higher means
(ns differences)
Pillai’s Trace= .141, F= 6,859;
p<.000
Pillai’s Trace= .266, F=
15,149; p<.000
Aviation has higher means
Pillai’s Trace= .105, F= 4,751;
p<.000
Non aviation has higher means
Pillai’s Trace= .189, F=9,675;
p<.000
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Discussion
Results obtained suggest differences between
aviation and non-aviation participants in every
dimension. In what concerns organizational
objectives, information on safety issues and risk
perceptions, non-aviation systematically has higher
means.
Non-aviation participants compose a positive
depiction of their companies: safety goals are clearly
stated, safety procedures work well and are followed,
there seems to be more information available on
safety issues but it is recognized that sometimes there
is a conflict between productivity and safety,
something mentioned in the literature.
In what concerns aviation participants, they seem to
have a personal relation with safety issues that
appears to be more positive (receive safety
information, understand safety rules, know training
needed) and there is a proactive attitude towards
safety (recognize that their personal intervention may
avoid potential hazards), and attitudes and behaviors
associated with an appreciation of risks involved in
their jobs.
Organizational practices and procedures towards
safety, management and supervisor’s behaviors and
attitudes and relationship with colleagues although
presenting mixed results provide support to the
differences previously identified. In the aviation
context, safety is part of performance appraisal,
supervisors are aware of what safety training each
worker has, and participants report reliable safety
behaviors in their colleagues. Non-aviation
participants report that their work procedures are
accurate and a reflection of what they actually do in
their jobs, characteristics probably associated with a
lesser degree of complexity in their jobs.
All in all, results suggest the presence of two
different safety systems. Aviation safety systems
seem to have at their centre individual safety
qualifications: a greater risk in the activities
performed is associated with the requirements for
specific and formal safety training. Such
qualifications are quite relevant in this context; not
only are they included in the performance appraisal
but also management and supervisors are aware of
each worker qualifications. In the aviation context, if
you do not have the necessary safety training, you
will not be able to work.
In contrast, non-aviation industries seem to centre on
the company safety records as a whole: company

goals are emphasized, general information on safety
is available, supervisors encourage involvement in
safety issues and are perceived to know safety
inspections’ results. This analysis is further supported
by non-aviation better results in “we are recognized
and rewarded for working together”.
In this sense it would be appropriate to say that
aviation safety systems are individualistic by nature
and non-aviation safety systems are much more
collectivistic. Such perspectives can also be
associated with an “organizational locus of control or
accountability”.
Results from non-aviation organizations may be
related with recent government investments in
workplace safety. Portugal has one of the worst work
accident rates in the European Community. Support
for safety training, safety programs, safety prizes,
safety inspections and media campaigns have been
created to address this problem. The problem is
depicted as a national problem (national statistics
may involve anyone) or an organizational problem
(fines for companies that do not follow safety
recommendations) and an issue that needs every
person’s contribution. Such perspective helps to
depart from an individualistic approach of work
accidents or the bad apple theory (Dekker, 2002) that
hinders organizational safety learning. Advantages of
this viewpoint should be considered by aviation
safety systems as it may complement the existing
perspective.
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